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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE CASE 
 This matter is before this court on appeal following 
proceedings having an unusual procedural history.  Appellee, 
McAllister Brothers, Inc., is a tugboat operator on the Delaware 
River in the Philadelphia area.  McAllister employed John Bethel 
as a river docking pilot between December 1987 and December 1990, 
when it discharged him.  Thereafter, Bethel brought this action 
against McAllister in the district court but he died after the 
trial.  Consequently, Thomas Bethel, the administrator of his 
3 
estate, is now the appellant.  Our references to "Bethel" in this 
opinion, however, are to John Bethel. 
 Bethel alleged in the complaint that he sustained 
personal injuries on December 17, 1990, while working as a 
docking pilot for McAllister, which shortly thereafter wrongfully 
discharged him.  He also contended that McAllister defamed him by 
asserting that it fired him because he refused to take a drug 
test after his injury, thereby suggesting that he was a drug user 
and hindering his efforts to obtain employment in the maritime 
and shipping industry.  In addition to McAllister, Bethel sued 
appellee Frank J. Huesser, a supervisor at McAllister, charging 
that he was also liable for these alleged wrongs.  Bethel 
obtained a judgment for his personal injuries under the Jones 
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, which McAllister satisfied, and McAllister 
obtained a judgment as a matter of law on the wrongful discharge 
claim, which is not at issue on this appeal.  Inasmuch as we are 
not concerned with these claims, and because Huesser's presence 
in this litigation in no way affects our disposition of the 
issues, as a matter of convenience we will treat this case as 
simply a defamation action between Bethel, succeeded by the 
appellant, and McAllister.  Of course, we nevertheless have 
considered the arguments Huesser set forth both in his brief and 
at oral argument. 
 At the trial, Bethel recovered a judgment for $554,000 
in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages on the 
defamation claim.  McAllister then successfully moved for a 
judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).  The 
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court concluded that the other towing companies in the 
Philadelphia area, which Bethel alleged would not hire him after 
McAllister discharged him, did not understand McAllister's 
statements as indicating that Bethel was a drug user, and further 
concluded that Bethel failed to prove that McAllister's 
statements caused him "special harm" as required by Pennsylvania 
law which is applicable to the defamation issues in this action. 
Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 461 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1984); see also Solosko v. Paxton, 119 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. 
1956). 
 Bethel then appealed, but before we could hear and 
decide the appeal, he died on December 4, 1993, so appellant was 
substituted for him as a party.  On February 4, 1994, over a 
dissent, in an unreported opinion we reversed the order granting 
the judgment as a matter of law and remanded the case for entry 
of a judgment in favor of the appellant.  Bethel v. McAllister 
Bros., Inc., No. 93-1358 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 1994).  We found that 
there was sufficient evidence that McAllister had defamed Bethel 
to support the jury's verdict.  Furthermore, we concluded that 
there was evidence that he had suffered special harm because 
Riverbus, Inc., a ferry operator that employed him after 
McAllister discharged him, terminated that employment when it 
learned from McAllister that it had discharged him for refusing 
to take a drug test.0  In reaching this result, we relied on 
                                                           
0In our earlier opinion we pointed out that we probably could 
sustain the verdict on the ground that McAllister's statements 
constituted slander per se, thus obviating the need for a showing 
of special harm.  Appellant, though noting this point in his 
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Bethel's testimony that Riverbus fired him when it acquired that 
information in a background check.  We also indicated that the 
award of compensatory damages was predicated, at least in part, 
on Riverbus having fired him.  On April 12, 1994, the district 
court entered judgment in favor of Bethel against McAllister in 
accordance with our mandate. 
 On March 1, 1994, McAllister moved in the district 
court for relief from the judgment to be entered on the remand 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), relying on evidence that it 
discovered after we reversed the judgment in favor of McAllister 
to establish that Bethel committed fraud at the trial.0  The 
evidence was Bethel's testimony in an arbitration proceeding 
against Riverbus after it discharged him.  Bethel testified in 
that proceeding that Riverbus discharged him for a myriad of 
reasons, of which his refusal to take the drug test as directed 
by McAllister was but one.   
 The district court granted McAllister's motion in an 
opinion and accompanying order, both dated July 11, 1994.  The 
court found that Bethel had given "patently misleading" testimony 
and had "knowingly concealed a material fact" at the trial and 
thus had committed fraud.  Consequently, the court vacated the 
judgment of April 12, 1994, and granted McAllister a new trial on 
both liability and damages.  Thereafter, at appellant's request, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
brief, does not rely on it in an effort to overturn the order he 
challenges on this appeal. 
0McAllister also asserted bases for the motion under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 60(b)(2) and (6), which the district court rejected and which 
are not implicated on this appeal. 
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the district court amended the order of July 11, 1994, by 
certifying it under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(b) so that he could seek 
leave to appeal.  We, however, denied leave to appeal on 
September 19, 1994.  In the meantime, the appellant sought 
reconsideration of the order of July 11, 1994, with respect to 
the scope of the retrial, which he argued the court should have 
limited to damages.  The district court, by order entered 
December 13, 1994, adhered to its decision that the new trial 
would be on both liability and damages. 
 The appellant did not wish to retry the case, as he had 
concluded that in light of the district court's findings that 
Bethel had committed perjury,0 he could not succeed in a retrial.  
Thus, in his view, the order granting a new trial effectively 
awarded McAllister a final judgment.  Therefore, at a conference 
on November 3, 1994, the appellant requested that the court enter 
a final judgment in McAllister's favor so that he could appeal 
the granting of the new trial.  The court, though acknowledging 
that the appellant was in a difficult position, did not do so.  
In this regard we are perplexed by the appellant's articulated 
concerns because we can conceive of no way that the jury at a 
retrial could have learned of the district court's conclusion 
that Bethel had committed perjury, though we can understand how 
McAllister might have been able to use Bethel's testimony from 
the arbitration hearing at the retrial, particularly if appellant 
                                                           
0The district court did not use the term "perjury" in describing 
Bethel's testimony in its July 11, 1994 opinion, but the parties 
have characterized its ruling as finding that Bethel had 
committed perjury.  Therefore we, too, use that term. 
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used Bethel's testimony from the first trial at a second trial.  
We explored the point at oral argument and appellant's attorney 
acknowledged that the district court never said that its holding 
under Rule 60(b)(3) somehow would be made known to the jury at 
the new trial.   
 In any event, appellant persisted in his efforts to 
have a final judgment entered in McAllister's favor.  In a motion 
filed January 27, 1995, he reiterated that such a judgment should 
be entered because he could not proceed and wished to appeal 
immediately.  The district court instead listed the case for 
trial.  Appellant then unsuccessfully moved again for entry of 
judgment.  
 Ultimately, the case came on for trial on April 27, 
1995.  At that time, appellant was free to proceed with the trial 
but did not do so.  Accordingly, the district court entered a 
final judgment against him, but did not do so on the ground that 
its opinion and order of July 11, 1994, granting relief under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), effectively had been a final judgment. 
Rather, as the court recited in its order of April 28, 1995, it 
dismissed the matter because of appellant's "failure to 
prosecute" the case.  Appellant then appealed from the orders of 
July 11, 1994, December 13, 1994, and April 28, 1995.0 
                                                           
0The district court exercised federal question and diversity 
jurisdiction.  While the complaint recites that the court could 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over 
the defamation claim because it had federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, this assertion is questionable.  See Lyon 
v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758 (3d Cir. 1995).  However, the diversity 
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II.  THE SCOPE OF THE APPEAL 
 We initially address an objection raised by McAllister 
to our entertaining this appeal.  In its brief, McAllister urges 
that appellant "has Waived his right to Appeal the July 11, 1994 
and December 1[3], 1994 Orders [granting a new trial] by Failing 
to Prosecute his Case at the Second Trial of this Action." 
McAllister seemed to believe, however, that appellant could and 
did appeal from the order of dismissal, as it did not suggest 
that he could not appeal from it and it supported the dismissal 
on the merits.0   
 We understand why McAllister concluded that appellant 
might be seeking a reversal of the order of dismissal.  After 
all, the notice of appeal recites that appellant is appealing 
from that order.  Furthermore, his brief sets forth the standard 
of review for orders of dismissal citing, inter alia, Titus v. 
Mercedes Benz of N. Am., 695 F.2d 746, 749 (3d Cir. 1982), and 
indicates that we can reverse the district court if it abused its 
discretion in dismissing the case.  Brief at 28.  Yet it did not 
appear clear to us from his overall brief that appellant was 
challenging the dismissal of the case or was seeking a new trial, 
for at the conclusion of his brief he requested that we reverse 
only the orders of July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994, and 
enter judgment in his favor.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
jurisdiction was sufficient for the court to hear the case.  We 
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
0Huesser makes the same contentions. 
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 We explored this ambiguity at oral argument and 
inquired whether appellant was seeking a new trial.  The answer 
was absolutely clear:  his attorney stated that this was an all-
or-nothing appeal in which appellant was seeking only the 
reinstatement of the judgment predicated on the verdict.  Thus, 
regardless of how we decided the appeal our decision would end 
the case, either because the judgment entered on the verdict 
would be reinstated or because appellant would not proceed with a 
new trial as permitted by the district court in its orders of 
July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994.  Consequently, we need not 
decide whether we should uphold the order of dismissal, as 
appellant does not challenge that order. 
 McAllister predicates its contention that appellant 
waived his right to appeal from the July 11, 1994 and December 
13, 1994 orders principally on three cases, Spain v. Gallegos, 26 
F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1994); Sullivan v. Pacific Indemn. Co., 566 
F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1977); and Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917 
(3d Cir. 1974).  In Spain, a female employee of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission brought a district court action 
against the EEOC, charging sexual and racial discrimination, 
sexual harassment and unlawful retaliation.  Immediately prior to 
the trial, the district court excluded certain evidence which the 
employee intended to offer in support of her sexual 
discrimination and harassment claims and barred her from 
proceeding on those claims on the basis of her remaining 
evidence.  Nevertheless, the employee was free to proceed with 
her claims for racial discrimination and retaliation.  But she 
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declined to do so, as she regarded the excluded evidence as 
closely connected to those claims.  The court then dismissed her 
case to the extent it was predicated on these remaining claims. 
 We held that the district court abused its discretion 
in excluding the disputed evidence and we reversed the order 
dismissing the sexual discrimination and harassment claims. 
Nevertheless, we affirmed the dismissal of the racial 
discrimination and retaliation claims, as the employee "was 
obliged to proceed with the trial notwithstanding the exclusion 
of the evidence."  26 F.3d at 454.  In reaching this conclusion, 
we explained that "[a] party disappointed with a court's ruling 
may not refuse to proceed and then expect to obtain relief on 
appeal from an order of dismissal or default."  Id.  
 Spain clearly is distinguishable from this case.  In 
that case the employee, though refusing to proceed with a trial 
though free to do so, later sought relief from the order entered 
as a consequence of her refusal to go forward.  This case is 
different because while the appellant, like the employee in 
Spain, would not go forward with the trial he, unlike the 
employee in that case, does not seek to be relieved of the 
consequences of his failure to proceed.  Quite to the contrary,  
he does not now seek a trial but argues only that a new trial 
should not have been granted.   
 Sullivan, 566 F.2d 444, is somewhat like Spain.  There 
the plaintiffs sought to bring a class action against an 
insurance company predicated on a claim that it overcharged 
certain physicians for malpractice insurance.  The named 
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plaintiffs moved to certify a class of plaintiffs, but on the day 
of trial the district court denied the motion to certify.  The 
plaintiffs then refused to present any evidence, whereupon the 
court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. 
 The plaintiffs then appealed, seeking only a review of 
the order denying class certification, as they did not contend 
that the dismissal was erroneous.  Id. at 445.  In these 
circumstances, we held that the plaintiffs had appealed from an 
interlocutory order, and dismissed the appeal for want of 
jurisdiction.  Sullivan differed from Spain in one respect, 
however, because in the latter case the employee urged that the 
district court improperly dismissed the balance of the case for 
failure to prosecute after it entered the earlier order to which 
the employee objected.  Thus, in Spain, unlike in Sullivan, we 
did not dismiss the appeal and instead affirmed the district 
court's order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. 
 Sullivan does not support McAllister's contention that 
we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the orders of 
July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994.  In Sullivan, the order 
denying the motion to certify the class was interlocutory because 
a reversal of it would not have ended the litigation, as the 
certification of the class would have been a futile gesture 
unless the plaintiffs could proceed to trial.  Thus, in Sullivan, 
unlike in this case, a reversal of the order denying 
certification and predating the dismissal would have resulted in 
further litigation, which would have required reinstatement of 
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the action.  Here, a reversal, no less than an affirmance, would 
end this litigation. 
 Marshall, 492 F.2d 917, is also similar to Spain.  In 
Marshall, a prisoner who brought a civil rights action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials and medical personnel at 
the prison, would not proceed with the trial after the district 
court refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 
for certain persons the prisoner desired to call as witnesses at 
the trial.  The district court dismissed the action for failure 
to prosecute, whereupon the prisoner appealed from both the 
dismissal and the denial of the writ.  We affirmed the dismissal 
for lack of prosecution but would not reach the issues generated 
by the court having denied the application for the writ, pointing 
out that "[i]f a litigant could refuse to proceed whenever a 
trial judge ruled against him, wait for the court to enter a 
dismissal for failure to prosecute, and then obtain review of the 
judge's interlocutory decision, the policy against piecemeal 
litigation and review would be severely weakened."  Id. at 919. 
 Yet Marshall, too, is distinguishable from this case. 
In Marshall, as in Sullivan, the appellant wished to appeal an 
order prior to the final order as a prelude to further 
litigation.  Furthermore, in Marshall, as in both Spain and 
Sullivan, the appellant could obtain meaningful relief in the 
action only if the order of dismissal was vacated or reversed and 
there then was a trial on the merits. 
 Our decisions in Spain, Sullivan, and Marshall, of 
course, fundamentally were premised upon the federal policy 
13 
against piecemeal appeals, codified in the final judgment rule of 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 
678 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The finality rule 'reflects federal policy 
against piecemeal appeals.'") (quoting Praxis Properties, Inc. v. 
Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 54 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991)).  Section 
1291 provides that "[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district 
courts of the United States."  While we give "a practical rather 
than technical construction" to section 1291, we must take care 
not to sacrifice the policy of limited appellate jurisdiction. 
Id. (citing Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1156 
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 2463 
(1987)).  With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an 
appeal unless the district court's order "ends the litigation on 
the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but 
execute the judgment."  Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 
Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1992, 1995 (1994) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Byrant v. Sylvester, 57 F.3d 308, 311 
(3d Cir. 1995).  That standard permitting appellate review has 
been met here.  If we set aside the district court's orders of 
July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994, appellant will be entitled 
to entry of a judgment in his favor, and if we affirm the orders, 
by his own stipulation, he will not be entitled to a trial.  In 
contrast to the situations raised by the appeals in Spain, 
Sullivan, and Marshall, the litigation would be terminated in 
either case.  Consequently we are persuaded that notwithstanding 
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their original character, the orders of July 11, 1994, and 
December 13, 1994, are final and appealable. 
 In this regard, we observe that it is well established 
that otherwise non-appealable orders may become appealable where 
circumstances foreclose the possibility of piecemeal litigation. 
For example, an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is 
ordinarily not appealable.  Where, however, the plaintiff cannot 
cure the defect in the complaint or elects to stand on the 
complaint without amendment, the order becomes final and 
appealable.  See Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d Cir. 
1991); see also Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1992) (holding that order of dismissal without prejudice was 
appealable where counsel informed court of appeals at oral 
argument that statute of limitations had run).  Indeed, the 
orders in this case have even greater indicia of finality than an 
appealable order dismissing a complaint without prejudice as 
their reversal, unlike the reversal of an order dismissing a 
complaint without prejudice, will not lead to a trial in the 
district court.0 
 Moreover, an otherwise non-appealable order may become 
final for the purposes of appeal where a plaintiff voluntarily 
and finally abandons the other claims in the litigation.  See 
Fassett, 807 F.2d at 1155-57.  In Fassett, for example, the 
                                                           
0We recognize that in some cases a reversal might lead to further 
proceedings regarding whether relief should have been granted 
under Rule 60(b)(3), see Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 
208 (3d Cir. 1983), but even if there were such a reversal here 
it would not lead to further proceedings addressing the merits of 
the case as appellant has abandoned his right to a new trial. 
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district court granted summary judgment in favor of all the 
defendants save one in a diversity action.  Choosing not to 
proceed to trial against the remaining defendant, the plaintiffs 
voluntarily dismissed their complaints against him.  Id. at 1154. 
On appeal, we held that the summary judgments were appealable for 
two independent reasons.  First, we found that the statute of 
limitations had run on the plaintiffs' claims against the 
remaining defendant at the time of the dismissals.  Id. at 1155. 
Second, the plaintiffs represented at oral argument that they 
would not pursue their claims against the remaining defendant in 
the federal courts.  Id. at 1156-57.  In either case, there were 
no outstanding issues or parties remaining in the district court 
so that we had jurisdiction over the appeal.  Id. at 1155, 1157. 
We explained that "it would be anomalous to hold that a plaintiff 
had no right to appeal the dismissal of all but one of his claims 
after that one claim not initially dismissed, had thereafter been 
voluntarily and finally abandoned."  Id. at 1155.  See also 
Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding 
that settlement agreements between plaintiffs and three of four 
defendants were appealable where plaintiffs renounced claims 
against fourth defendant at oral argument).0 
                                                           
0Al-Torki v. Kaempen,      F.3d     , 1996 WL 89101 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 5, 1996), which Judge Nygaard cites is factually 
distinguishable because there the appellant challenged an order 
for a new trial after the original trial as well as the 
subsequent order dismissing his complaint when he did not proceed 
at the new trial.  Thus, while he challenged the district court 
order granting a new trial, unlike appellant he sought a new 
trial himself in the event that the court of appeals upheld the 
district court's order granting a new trial.  Furthermore,        
Al-Torki involved an appeal from an order for a new trial under 
16 
 We note a persuasive analogy in this case to our review 
of orders granting a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. 
Like the grant of a Rule 60(b) motion, an order granting a new 
trial under Rule 59 ordinarily is interlocutory and non-
appealable.  National Passenger R.R. Corp. v. Maylie, 910 F.2d 
1181, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) ("When an order granting a Rule 60(b) 
motion merely vacates the judgment and leaves the case pending 
for further determination, the order is akin to an order granting 
a new trial and in most instances, is interlocutory and 
nonappealable.").  The grant of a new trial under Rule 59, 
however, does not escape review.  On appeal following the new 
trial, we will review the order and may reinstate the judgment 
from the first trial if we find that the new trial should not 
have been granted.  Blancha v. Raymark Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 511-
12 (3d Cir. 1992).  In this case, it is as if the appellant were 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 rather than an appeal from an order for a new 
trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) following the vacation of a 
judgment on a post-trial motion for relief from a judgment. Judge 
Nygaard notes, typescript at 6 n.1, "[a]nalytically, [a] second 
trial held after grant of a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 
can be viewed as a continuation of the first."  But his support 
for this statement comes from 15B Charles A. Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3915.5 at 299 (2d ed. 1992) which 
indicates that "[n]ew trial orders can be seen as part of the 
original and ordinary trial process."  However, this 
characterization does not apply to a new trial ordered following 
the vacation of a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) which 
certainly is not part of the "original and ordinary trial 
process."  Yet to a degree Al-Torki does support Judge Nygaard's 
position on this appeal.  Nevertheless we believe that our result 
is correct for the reasons we have set forth.  In fact, inasmuch 
as allowing the appeal on the limited issues which appellant 
raises does not offend principles of finality, we could justify 
dismissal of the appeal only as a sanction for appellant's 
failure to prosecute the case at the retrial.  We see no reason 
for such a sanction as appellant is not seeking a new trial. 
17 
challenging the grant of a new trial after an adverse judgment in 
the second trial.  The appellant is essentially willing to 
concede defeat in the second trial and to rest his success or 
failure completely on the outcome of our review of the district 
court's order granting a new trial under Rule 60(b). 
 Finally, we point out that the order of dismissal does 
not preclude us from reviewing the orders of July 11, 1994, and 
December 13, 1994, even though the dismissal terminated the case 
in the district court and is not being reviewed.  The appeal here 
is similar to an appeal from an order entered prior to a remand 
of a case by a district court to the state court from which the 
case had been removed.  In such a case, an order entered prior to 
remand may be appealable even though the order of remand itself 
may not be appealable.  See Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1353 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 68 (1993).  The sequence of 
events is the same here.  The July 11, 1994, and December 13, 
1994 orders predated the order of dismissal.  Of course, we do 
not go so far as to hold that orders entered before dismissal 
always are appealable after a dismissal.  Sullivan demonstrates 
that they are not.  Rather, we confine ourselves to the unique 
circumstances here in which a reversal of the earlier order would 
mean that the proceedings leading to the dismissal never should 
have been held.  Other factual scenarios may lead to different 
results.  Overall, we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to 
review the July 11, 1994 and December 13, 1994 orders, and thus 
we reach the merits of this appeal. 
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III.  THE MERITS 
 In discussing the merits, we first summarize the 
district court's comprehensive opinion of July 11, 1994.  In that 
opinion, the court set forth the procedural background of the 
case and then described the facts.  It indicated that Bethel had 
been injured on McAllister's vessel on December 17, 1990, when he 
fell down a flight of stairs.  The following day, McAllister told 
Bethel to report to work to submit to a drug test that it claimed 
was being administered to all its river docking pilots that day. 
Bethel refused to report because he was unable to do so.  On 
December 21, 1990, McAllister told Bethel that his employment was 
terminated, and he received a letter to that effect the following 
day. 
 Thereafter, rumors circulated in the Delaware River 
maritime community that McAllister terminated Bethel's employment 
because he was a drug user.  Bethel never again obtained full-
time employment as a river docking pilot, although Riverbus, a 
New Jersey ferry operator, employed him as a captain operating 
boats between Camden and Philadelphia from March 25, 1992, until 
June 28, 1992.  His Riverbus employment ended about three weeks 
before the trial in this case, which was from July 21, 1992, 
through July 27, 1992.  Bethel testified that Riverbus fired him 
as the result of a background check, which he understood to mean 
that McAllister told Riverbus about Bethel's refusal to take the 
drug test. 
 The district court indicated that McAllister sought 
relief from the judgment on remand under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) 
19 
because of Bethel's fraud.  In particular, the alleged fraud was 
that Bethel did not testify truthfully about the reasons Riverbus 
gave him for his discharge as Bethel, at an arbitration hearing 
in a proceeding against Riverbus ten months after the trial in 
this case, said Riverbus gave him additional reasons for his 
discharge.  The district court also pointed out that, as we 
recognized in the earlier appeal, Bethel claimed three possible 
sources of lost earnings in this case, full-time docking pilot 
work, part-time docking pilot work, and the position at Riverbus 
which paid $37,000 per year.  However, any claim based on loss of 
income from the first source was weak. 
 The district court compared Bethel's testimony at the 
jury trial on July 21, 1992, in this case, with his arbitration 
testimony ten months after the trial on May 17, 1993.  At the 
jury trial, Bethel had testified that Riverbus told him that it 
was terminating his employment "due to an unsatisfactory 
background check" and he then explained that "[w]hat was told to 
me, is that they had called my previous employer and they had 
become aware that allegedly I refused to take a drug test. 
Therefore they did not -- they would not have me in their 
employ."  Yet, at the arbitration hearing Bethel testified that 
on June 23, 1992, Riverbus gave him eight reasons why it was 
terminating his employment, which the district court in a fair 
characterization of his testimony at the arbitration hearing 
described in its July 11, 1994 opinion as follows:  "(1) a bad 
background check, that included talking to McAllister, who told 
[Riverbus] that plaintiff refused to take a drug test; (2) having 
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been fired by former employers for being drunk; (3) failing to 
draw up a schedule for crew assignments; (4) reporting to work 
drunk; (5) not conducting a fire drill; (6) being late for work; 
(7) failure to get along with fellow employees; and (8) 
improperly changing the logs." 
 The court pointed out that the reasons that Riverbus 
gave Bethel for discharging him must have been fresh in his mind 
when he testified at the jury trial, as Riverbus had given them 
to him only three weeks earlier.  Despite this fact, the court 
then indicated that it now knew in light of Bethel's testimony at 
the arbitration hearing that his "testimony given to the jury was 
patently misleading as to the reasons for his being discharged 
from Riverbus.  A review of the versions of the testimony at both 
the trial and the arbitration discloses that [Bethel] only told 
the jury one of the reasons given for his firing.  This turned 
out to be the reason the Third Circuit would later cite as the 
strongest evidence of his damages, in an otherwise 'weak' case." 
The court concluded that if the jury knew about the additional 
reasons Riverbus gave Bethel for the discharge, it could have 
found that Bethel's failure "to take the drug test for defendant 
McAllister had little or nothing to do with the equally or more 
substantial ground advanced by Riverbus" for the discharge.  The 
court concluded that Bethel "knowingly concealed a material fact 
-- indeed, seven material facts, being the undisclosed other 
grounds -- for being discharged by Riverbus." 
 The court discussed numerous precedents under Rule 
60(b), but naturally in the inherently fact-specific inquiry 
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triggered by a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, all differed on the facts. 
The court then said that there "can be no doubt that the withheld 
information was well within the scope of the question being 
asked, which foreclosed plaintiff's right to pick and choose 
those items of truth he preferred the jury to hear."  The court 
indicated that while it is possible that McAllister's attorney 
could have cross-examined Bethel about the reasons for the firing 
more extensively than he did, the attorney's methods were 
understandable as Riverbus terminated Bethel long after discovery 
had been closed and only three weeks before trial.  The judge 
indicated that Bethel's testimony was the only basis for the 
$554,000 award and that the jury had been told that Bethel who 
was 37 years old was earning $37,000 annually at Riverbus.  In 
these circumstances, the court held that McAllister was entitled 
to a new trial.  Furthermore, the trial was to be on both 
liability and damages because Bethel's testimony regarding what 
Riverbus told him was relevant on both issues. 
 We use the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing 
the district court's orders under Rule 60(b)(3).  Central W. 
Rental Co. v. Horizon Leasing, 967 F.2d 832, 836 (3d Cir. 1992). 
In this review, we ascertain whether the misconduct prevented 
McAllister from fully and fairly presenting its defense.  See 
Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 We cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion in granting the new trial.  In addition to the patent 
inconsistency between Bethel's trial testimony and arbitration 
testimony that we already have noted, there were other 
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inconsistencies between his trial and arbitration evidence.  At 
trial, Bethel testified that Riverbus gave him a letter dated 
June 24, 1992, which stated that "due to unsatisfactory 
background check, that I was to be put on probation for the rest 
of my life."  In fact, the letter, which was not produced at 
trial, said "that an unsatisfactory background check and 
performance rating has been given to Captain John Bethel and that 
[he] is placed on probationary status until further notice."0 
Furthermore, as the district court noted, Bethel also testified 
at the arbitration hearing that Riverbus told him on June 28, 
1992, the date it actually discharged him, that it was doing so 
because he "refused to take a drug test in McAllister's and . . . 
didn't show up for work on the weekend."  In the circumstances, 
it is perfectly clear that Bethel created a false impression that 
Riverbus told him that his difficulties arising from McAllister's 
discharge of him cost him his job at Riverbus, whereas he knew 
that Riverbus had told him that much more was involved. 
 This misrepresentation was not merely material to his 
case.  It was crucial.  Indeed, on the first appeal, though we 
reversed the district court's order granting McAllister a 
judgment in its favor under Rule 50(b), we characterized Bethel's 
case as "thin" and described aspects of it as "not . . . strong" 
and "weak."  Indeed, it was so thin that the district court felt 
                                                           
0In the appellant's reply brief, he contends that we should not 
rely on this letter as it was not in evidence before the district 
court and the court did not rely on the letter.  We reject this 
contention as the district court did rely on the letter, quoting 
it in full. 
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that the verdict could not stand and, on the first appeal, one 
judge of this court agreed with him.  The misrepresentation thus 
buttressed a weak case and was almost certainly the basis for the 
award of damages, as we cannot understand how the jury could have 
settled on its large award of compensatory damages, except on the 
basis of Bethel's loss of earnings attributable to Riverbus's 
discharge.  Clearly, by concealing the actual reasons Riverbus 
gave him for his discharge, Bethel prevented McAllister from 
fully and fairly presenting its defense, as these events took 
place after discovery was closed and immediately before the 
trial.   
 We acknowledge that it is less clear that the 
misrepresentation was responsible for the verdict on liability, 
though it well may have been, as it is possible that the jury 
might have believed that Riverbus had not discharged Bethel 
because it believed him to be a drug user if it knew that 
Riverbus gave Bethel additional reasons for discharging him.  In 
any event, in view of the appellant's concession that he does not 
want a new trial, any uncertainty of the consequence of the 
perjury on the verdict of liability does not matter, as a finding 
of liability without an opportunity for a damages trial would be 
of no use to him.  As we have indicated, appellant made it clear 
at oral argument that the only relief he wanted on this appeal 
was a reinstatement of the verdict in Bethel's favor and entry of 
a judgment on it.0  In these circumstances, we need not explore 
                                                           
0This concession is understandable since Bethel's arbitration 
proceeding against Riverbus resulted in a decision after the 
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the possibility that even if we held that the district court 
should have limited its order for a new trial to a trial on 
damages, the line of cases culminating in Spain, which we 
discussed above, would preclude appellant from proceeding with 
the case on the theory that he refused to proceed on a trial 
which would have included damages, when he had an opportunity to 
do so.0 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of 
July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994, and will dismiss the appeal 
to the extent that appellant recited in his notice of appeal that 
it was taken from the order of April 28, 1995. 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
trial requiring his reinstatement and because Bethel died before 
the original appeal.  In these circumstances, the damages the 
appellant could have demonstrated at a retrial surely would have 
been limited.  Furthermore, a liability trial would have been 
very difficult for the appellant because there is evidence that 
Bethel died from an adverse reaction to drug use.  Indeed, his 
death certificate recites that such a reaction was the cause of 
death.  Accordingly, while Bethel contended McAllister defamed 
him by suggesting that he was a drug user, McAllister at a 
retrial would have been in a position to assert a truth defense. 
0In some situations, it might be appropriate for a court to 
conduct a hearing to determine the relevant facts on a motion 
under Rule 60(b)(3), but in this case that was not necessary 
because the records of the trial and the arbitration proceeding 
conclusively demonstrated the fraud and nothing that the 
appellant produced on the motion in the district court was 
adequate to trigger a need for a hearing.  See Stridiron, 698 












NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 The district court, after earlier granting defendants' 
motion for relief from judgment and ordering a new trial, 
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute when appellant, who 
first stated unequivocally that he would present his case, later 
recanted and expressly refused to proceed to trial.  The 
appellant does not challenge the propriety of the district 
court's dismissal.  Indeed, the majority and I also agree that 
there was nothing improper about it.  Without challenging the 
propriety of that dismissal, however, appellant asks that we 
review the underlying interlocutory orders granting a new trial. 
I would not do so.  Unless we can vacate or reverse the dismissal 
order, the case is over; because that appropriate dismissal lies 
athwart the way to review all other underlying, interlocutory 
orders. 
  Before now we would not review underlying interlocutory 
orders if the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
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entering judgment for failure to prosecute.  See Sullivan v. 
Pacific Indem. Co., 566 F.2d 444, 445, (3d Cir. 1977); Marshall 
v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 919, (3d Cir. 1974).  See also Spain v. 
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1994).  These cases establish that 
a party who tries to obtain appellate review of otherwise 
interlocutory orders by refusing to proceed to trial engages in 
an impermissible strategy.   
 We established this narrow scope of review for three 
reasons:  first, there is a presumption of propriety for court 
orders -- they are enforceable unless stayed or reversed; second, 
to avoid piecemeal litigation -- because, as we recognize, the 
results of the new trial may well cure complaints about the 
interlocutory orders; and third, to vindicate and encourage 
proper respect for the district court's authority -- because, we 
simply cannot allow counsel to flout proper orders of the 
district courts.  The majority cannot overturn our precedent. 
Instead, it creates an exception to our holdings in Spain, 
Sullivan, and Marshall, which is both unnecessary and imprudent. 
I would not do so.  I would affirm the district court's 
dismissal, and hence not reach the propriety of the interlocutory 
orders.   
I. 
 Appellant incorrectly theorizes that a decision 
granting a new trial is always reviewable after any subsequent 
judgment.  In Blancha v. Raymark Indus., 972 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 
1992), we held that:  
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[w]hile an order granting a new trial is 
purely interlocutory and thus is not an 
appealable final order within the meaning of 
section 1291, such an order is reviewable 
after a final order is entered following 
retrial. 
Id. at 511-512 (emphasis added). 
 If, however, there is no retrial because the district 
court dismisses the case in response to plaintiff's clear and 
unequivocal refusal to proceed with a second trial, and 
especially where as here, the appellant does not challenge the 
dismissal, then the earlier interlocutory order is simply not 
reviewable.  This result is both fair and prudent.  Where the 
dismissal was a sanction, as for failure to prosecute, the case 
is distinguishable from those cases where the case was properly 
litigated to a conclusion, and the unsuccessful party then seeks 
on appeal to challenge the interlocutory order granting a new 
trial. 
Al-Torki v. Kaempen, -- F.3d ---, ---,  1996 WL 89101, *4 (9th 
Cir. March 5, 1996).  We would serve a greater purpose by 
admonishing counsel to follow proper procedure and to heed the 
orders of our colleagues on the trial bench, and by requiring 
that litigants give the system the chance to resolve disputes 
through trial, rather than allowing them to simply take a dive 
and then seek relief in the court of appeals. 
 In Marshall, the plaintiff refused to proceed with 
trial, and the district court dismissed the case for failure to 
prosecute.  We stated that "the scope of appellate review of an 
order of dismissal is extremely narrow, confined solely to 
whether the trial court has abused its discretion." 492 F.2d at 
918.  Appropriately, we found that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion: 
Indeed, appellant left the district court no 
choice. . . . [T]he "proper procedure" was to 
proceed. . . . The issues in the case may 
well have been resolved. . . . If appellant 
had proceeded, he might have been successful. 
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If appellant had proceeded and lost, the 
appellate court would have had a complete 
record upon which to make its determination. 
 For these reasons we affirm the 
dismissal for lack of prosecution and do not 
reach the substantive issue involving the 
[underlying ruling] . . . . 
Id. at 919. 
 Marshall emphasized that if we were to review the 
interlocutory rulings, we would "undermine the ability of trial 
judges to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 
cases."  Id.  What appellant would have us do, and what the 
majority does, directly undermines the trial court's authority to 
control the proceedings before it. 
 In Sullivan, plaintiffs sued an insurance company for a 
premium refund.  Plaintiffs sought class certification, which was 
denied by the district court on the day of trial.  In the face of 
this ruling, plaintiffs refused to present any evidence.  The 
court then dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.  We noted 
that, since plaintiffs did not contend that the court abused its 
discretion by dismissing for failure to prosecute, the only 
matters they presented for review on appeal were the 
interlocutory class certification decisions.  We dismissed for 
lack of an appealable order.  Counsel for appellant, here, made 
it very clear at oral argument that he does not challenge the 
district court's discretion in dismissing his case. 
 In Spain, we faced the situation where, after the 
district court granted partial summary judgment, the plaintiff 
refused to proceed on her remaining claims of racial 
discrimination and unlawful retaliation.  She believed (as 
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appellant here mistakenly believes) that the court's previous 
rulings effectively precluded her from succeeding on her 
remaining claims.  The court appropriately dismissed the 
remaining claims for failure to prosecute.  On appeal, we held 
that the court did not abuse its discretion in so doing.  Spain's 
refusal to prosecute her remaining claims forever barred any 
recovery on them.  We reasoned that 
[a] party disappointed with a court's ruling 
may not refuse to proceed and then expect to 
obtain relief on appeal from an order of 
dismissal or default. 
26 F.3d at 454.  Bethel was no less obliged to proceed simply 
because he had an earlier underlying judgment in his favor. 
 The majority tries to distinguish Spain on the basis 
that the appellant here does not seek to be relieved of the 
dismissal.  I believe that he must, however, have the order of 
dismissal set aside before the interlocutory rulings can be 
reviewed.  The majority, instead, saves appellant (and future 
appellants like him) from his own sanctionable conduct and grants 
him an undeserved opportunity to have the judgment from the first 
trial reinstated.  The majority reasons that, because review 
under our ruling on the merits will end this litigation, the 
underlying interlocutory orders were transformed into final 
appealable orders.   
 This reasoning, while temptingly efficient, does not  
comport with law or logic.  The general rule is that an order 
granting a new trial becomes reviewable after the second trial 
(or other judgment entered in the normal course of proceedings). 
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If the second trial is aborted by a dismissal when a litigant 
refuses to proceed at the moment of trial, the litigant must 
suffer the consequences of his refusal.  I would conclude that 
Bethel's position, that he need not challenge the dismissal for 
failure to prosecute, is fatal to his appeal.0  
 Were we simply to affirm this unquestionably proper 
dismissal order, which I say we must, we would do no injustice to 
appellant.  When the district court informed appellant well 
before the date of the second trial that, if he refused to 
proceed, it would dismiss the case for failure to prosecute, the 
record establishes that the appellant clearly indicated he 
                                                           
0Analytically, a second trial held after grant of a new trial 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 can be viewed as a continuation of the 
first.  The new trial order thus merges with the second judgment. 
 
New trial orders can be seen as part of the 
original and ordinary trial process, to be 
protected against immediate appellate 
intrusion for reasons little different from 
the reasons that preclude direct appeal from 
evidentiary rulings during the course of 
trial.  In many cases a retrial can be 
accomplished much more quickly than an 
appeal, and the result may avoid the need for 
any appeal.   
 
15 B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§3915.5 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
 Although this case involves the grant of a new trial 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), the grant of a new trial under 
either rule is an unappealable interlocutory order which is 
afforded review after subsequent judgment.  When appeal is taken 
from a properly obtained judgment in the continued proceedings, 
if the judgment is inconsistent with the result in the first 
trial, the appellate court can then determine whether the initial 
result prevails because the grant of the new trial was error. 
When, however, the entire case is dismissed for failure to 
prosecute, unless the court abused its discretion in ordering the 
sanction, the correctness of any interlocutory decisions is 
irrelevant and the sanction prevails. 
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understood the consequences of a judgment for failure to 
prosecute:  his appeal of the underlying rulings would be barred. 
 The district court indicated, as we did in Marshall, 
that if appellant prevailed at the second trial his allegations 
of error would be cured by results; and if not, he could then 
appeal.  The court did not demand anything unreasonable from 
appellant, but required only that he give the system a chance to 
produce a favorable result under well-established procedure.  And 
if the court's interlocutory ruling had caused him to lose, he 
could appeal.  That is how the system works.  Appellant 
nevertheless chose to quit at a most inopportune time.  We should 
not save him from his knowing and calculated decision. 
 The court in Al-Torki, confronted this very issue, and 
held that an order granting a new trial is unreviewable if the 
claims are subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.  Like 
appellant, Al-Torki won at the first trial.  After the district 
court granted defendant a new trial, Al-Torki failed to appear at 
the second trial, and the district court dismissed the case for 
failure to prosecute.  Unlike appellant, Al-Torki argued that the 
district court erred by dismissing for failure to prosecute.  
 After the appellate court rejected Al-Torki's argument 
regarding the dismissal, it determined that, as a result of the 
proper dismissal, the order granting the new trial was 
unreviewable.  The court opined: 
This case presents a simple refusal to appear 
at the time set for trial.  Such a willful 
failure to appear for trial forfeits a 
litigant's right to appeal interlocutory 
orders prior to judgment. 
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1996 WL 89101, *5.  Appellant's conduct here was no less willful. 
The result and reasoning in Al-Torki is sound, and it is 
consistent with our jurisprudence.  
II. 
 I fully recognize that a litigant who has succeeded in 
a first trial may not want to fight the battle again, and that 
the rule denying immediate review of an order granting a new 
trial places burdens on the originally successful litigant. 
Nevertheless, new trial orders are not unusual, and the rule is 
firmly rooted in the policies embodied by Congress in 28 U.S.C. 
§1291, which support appeals only from, and of, final judgments, 
save in very limited circumstances. 
 Moreover, the law recognizes these burdens and provides 
a procedure by which a party may move for entry of judgment in 
favor of the opposing party.  If his motion is granted, he may 
then appeal without enduring the second trial.   See United 
States V. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (entry of a 
final judgment in favor of party sought by opposing party allows 
the opposing party to appeal the adverse underlying rulings); 
Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 
1990) (same).  This procedure affords review of the order, even 
though the party appealing solicited the judgment. 
A party who is willing to gamble on review of 
the new trial order, however, may be able to 
win the right to appeal by soliciting entry 
of an adverse final judgment.  There is a 
cogent argument that the solicited judgment 
is final if the scope of review is limited to 
the order granting a new trial and affirmance 
of that order leads to affirmance of the 
judgment rather than remand for a new trial. 
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Appeal is bought at the cost of wagering all 
on reversal of the new trial order, but this 
cost may seem small to a party who is unable 
to afford a new trial in any event. 
15B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§3915.5 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995).   
 Appellant states that he moved for entry of judgment on 
this basis, but the district court denied the motion.  He did not 
attempt to appeal this order -- which would be rendered 
essentially unreviewable following a retrial -- under the 
collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), and instead emphatically indicated to 
the court and opposing counsel that, he would indeed "put on a 
complete trial."  Nonetheless, appellant refused to go forward on 
the day of trial, and the district court, not surprisingly, 
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.    
III. 
 Appellant's refusal to try his case combined with 
counsel's statement at oral argument on appeal that appellant now 
will risk all on our decision, does not substitute for his 
obligation to obey proper orders and to follow proper procedure, 
and can neither nullify the otherwise proper dismissal, nor 
resuscitate his earlier verdict.  I would hold that the district 
court's underlying orders are not reviewable after a dismissal 
for failure to prosecute unless and until appellant can 
successfully challenge the dismissal.  Because the dismissal here 
is unassailed and unassailable, I would affirm the judgment of 
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the district court, and never reach the issue of whether the 
district court erred by ordering a new trial.  
